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Due to its distinctive institutional background, Oman offers a valuable opportunity to
investigate stability of dividend policy. In Oman, (1) there are no taxes on dividends, (2)
firms are highly levered mainly through bank loans, (3) there is a high concentration of stock
ownership, and (4) there is variability in cash dividend payments. These factors suggest a
diminished role of dividend smoothing in Oman. Our results show that Omani financial firms
have erratic dividend policies. These results are inconsistent with the predictions suggested by
the relatively weak corporate governance, government ownership, and dividend signaling.
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I. Introduction
It is well documented that firms in the US smooth their dividends. In s well cited
study, Lintner (1956) shows that US companies have stable dividend policies. He
finds that managers are reluctant to raise (cut) dividends immediately following an
increase (decrease) in earnings. Hence, changes in dividends appear to lag changes in
earnings by a number of periods. Subsequent research by Fama and Babiak (1968),
Brav et al. (2005), and Aivazian et al. (2006) confirm Lintner's original findings.
Using data from the UK, Michaely and Roberts (2007) report that dividend smoothing
is more pronounced in public firms relative to private firms where potential agency
issues and information asymmetries are more pronounced. More recently, Leary and
Michaely (2009) find that dividend smoothing has been increasing over the past 50
years, suggesting that managers are more concerned about dividend smoothing today.
The majority of these studies are conducted using US data. One natural
question is whether these dividend effects are peculiar to the US or if they are also
prominent in countries where the tax regime and/or institutional and economic
characteristics are significantly different. The purpose of this paper is to examine
whether Omani financial firms smooth their dividends by applying the Lintner's
partial adjustment model. We also examine whether Omani financial firms have a
long-term target payout ratio.
The financial sector plays a crucial role in economic development in Oman. The
contribution of the financial sector to the Gross Domestic Product occupies second
place after oil and gas. The importance of the financial sector can also bee seen from
its representation in the stock market which represents 51% of market capitalization in
2008. The financial sector has the highest liquidity with the highest number of shares
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traded in the Muscat Securities Market (MSM). The sector accounts for 59% of shares
traded and 45% of total profits of MSM-listed firms in 2008.
Several important economic and institutional features make Oman a unique and
interesting environment in which to examine the stability of dividend policy. There
are reasons that may suggest Omani financial firms may adopt a smoothing dividend
policy and there are other reasons that may suggest otherwise. First, Omani firms pay
a large proportion of their earnings through dividends. This is very different from the
western countries which are known to distribute moderate dividends. Omani investor's
attitude towards dividends may contribute to the higher payout ratio. Most investors
in Oman consider dividends as the principal component of stock returns (Al-Yahyaee,
2006).
Second, there are no taxes on dividends in Oman. This is very different from
Western countries which have been traditionally taxing dividends at a higher rate than
capital gains. The absence of taxes in Oman may have an impact on dividend stability.
Rozycki (1997) shows that personal income taxes provide managers with a motivation
to smooth the dividend payments. He provides evidence that dividend smoothing has
increased the wealth for a tax paying investor by reducing the present value of the
investor's future expected income tax liabilities. Consequently, the absence of
personal income taxes is expected to reduce the importance of dividend stability in
Oman.
Third, Omani companies rely heavily on bank financing (Al-Yahyaee, 2006).
Aivazian et al. (2003a) suggest that bank debt reduce that the moral hazard problem
and the agency problem.1 Aivazian et al. (2003b, 2006) argue that dividend stability
should be less important in bank centric countries like Oman because bank debt
1

See Aivazian et al. (2003a) for a discussion on the role of bank debt in reducing the agency cost.
Fleming, Heaney, and McCosker (2005) also provide a discussion of the benefits of debt financing in
alleviating the agency problem.
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reduces the value of agency reduction roles typically fulfilled by dividend payments.
Dewenter and Warther (1998) also suggest that dividend stability may not be
important for companies that rely on bank debt due to bank monitoring. Hence, the
reliance of Omani firms on bank debt financing implies that dividend stability may
not be important for Omani firms.
However, there are reasons that may suggest that banks in Oman may be relatively
ineffective in monitoring. Saidi and Kumar (2008) suggest that corporate governance
in Oman is relatively weak. They demonstrate that banks in Arab Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries including Oman play limited role in scrutinizing corporate
governance practices of borrowers.2 Saidi and Kumar (2008) indicate that there is a
relatively weaker institutional characteristic in the GCC countries including Oman in
terms of disclosure and transparency requirements, creditor rights, enforcement of
contracts, regulations, oversight, and minority shareholder rights. Mohamed et al.
(2008) find that many Omani firms do not comply with the Code of Corporate
Governance.3 They observe that the implementation, monitoring, and enforcement
aspects of the corporate governance regulatory regime are still at a nascent stage.4 La
Porta et al. (1998) claim that the lack of transparency, inadequate legal infrastructure,
and weak investment protection in emerging markets all enhance the role of dividends
as a reputation mechanism. In this case, and even with the close banking relations and
closely held nature of firms, dividend payment is extremely important to attract
capital (Aivazian et al., 2003b). The relatively weak institutional variables and the
relative noncompliance with corporate governance codes may reduce the
2

GCC countries include United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain.
The Capital Market Authority (CMA) in June 2002, published its Corporate Governance Code
(Circular No. 11/2002), which was later amended and replaced by Circular No. 1/2003 of April 2003.
The Code requires all listed companies to publish a section on corporate governance in their annual
financial statements. This Code is not as elaborate as corporate governance regimes in western
countries (Mohamed et al., 2009)
4
See Mohamed et al. (2008) for a detailed description of Corporate Governance in Oman.
3
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effectiveness of banks in monitoring firms. This may suggest that the impact of bankcentricity on dividend stability may be relatively ineffective in Oman. The relatively
weak governance practices in Oman may induce firms to pay out more dividends to
offset the weak monitoring through corporate governance mechanism. John and
Knyazeva (2008) claim that firms will use payout policy to mitigate the agency
conflict due to poor governance. They argue that poor corporate governance
exacerbates the agency costs of free cash flow. Hence, a higher level of dividends is
necessary to impose a constraint on the manager. Consistent with their proposition,
John and Knyazeva (2008) find that firms with weak corporate governance are more
likely to pay higher dividends. Similarly, Knyazeva (2008) shows that weakly
governed managers engage in more dividend smoothing and pay high dividends.
Fourth, Omani firms are owned by a small number of investors who have
controlling interests. Al-Yahyaee et al. (2009) show that the average ownership of
MSM-listed firms by shareholders who own at least ten percent of the issued capital is
52 percent. A significant part of this ownership belongs to the government. In fact,
Al-Yahyaee (2006) shows that government ownership is a significant factor that
affects dividend policy in Oman. Government-controlled firms are expected to suffer
most from agency problem as they are ultimately owned by the citizens (Gugler,
2003). As most citizens are only indirect shareholders of government-controlled
firms, they have few incentives to monitor the management. Consequently, the
managers of government-controlled firms will prefer a stable dividend policy with
high dividends to keep their principals happy. Gugler (2003) examines the potential
impact of a range of different types of shareholders on dividends for a sample of
Austrian firms and report evidence that government-controlled firms have the highest
dividend payout and practice dividend smoothing. Hence, the higher dividend payout
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and the stability of dividends in Oman may be the consequence of corporate control.
The high government ownership in Oman implies that the potential agency problem is
likely to be high due to the few incentives of the shareholders (government) to
monitor the management. Consequently, dividends in Oman may serve as a corporate
governance device bonding managers to generate sufficient cash flow to honor the
precommitted level of dividends. Therefore, firms in Oman are more likely to pay
high dividends and follow stable dividend policies.
Fifth, Omani firms appear to use dividends to signal their future prospectus (AlYahyaee et al., 2009). The dividend signaling theory is based on the belief that
investors prefer stable dividend over the years and firms are reluctant to cut dividends.
John and Williams (1985) show that, in equilibrium, the optimal dividend policy is to
pay smoothed dividends relative to stock prices. Their model implies that when
dividends are used as a signaling mechanism firms are expected to smooth their
dividends. In a similar vein, Guttman et al. (2008) show that dividend smoothing can
arise from a coarse signaling equilibrium in a setting where managers have private
information about firm value. Al-Yahyaee et al. (2009) find that Omani firms use
dividends to signal their future prospects. Dividends are smoothed with respect to
earnings to be a credible signal (Jeong, 2008). This may suggest that Omani firms use
dividends as a signal to convey their private information to outsiders. Hence, Omani
firms are more likely to smooth their dividends to strengthen the credibility of
dividends as a signal of firm's future prospects.
Finally, a feature of Omani MSM-listed firms is their variability in cash dividend
payments. The majority of Omani firms change their dividends almost every year.
This practice contrasts with patterns observed in the US and other developed
countries, where most stocks experience relatively few changes in their dividends. In
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fact, Aharony and Swary (1980) find that about 87% of sampled firms had no change
in quarterly dividend payments in the U.S during the period January 1963 to
December 1976. In the data sampled by Bajaj and Vijh (1990), more than 80% of
announcements made between July 1962 and June 1987 involve no change in
dividends. More recently, Hallock and Mashayekhi (2006) find that 80% of firms do
not change their dividends in the US during the period 1970-2000. The variability of
dividends may suggest a diminished role of dividend stability in Oman.
Whether or not dividends are stable in Oman is an empirical question. While
studies in developed markets show that firms smooth dividends, the picture is less
clear in Oman. On the one hand, the relatively weak corporate governance,
government ownership, and dividend signaling all suggest that firms may have stable
dividend policies. On the other hand, high bank leverage, the absence of taxes and the
variability in cash dividend payments may suggest that firms may have unstable
dividend policies. Whether the net effect of these factors on dividend stability is
positive or negative is an empirical issue.
Our research provides a number of interesting results on stability of dividend
policy. First, we find that Omani financial firms have unstable dividend policies. This
instability of dividends support the predictions suggested by the high bank leverage,
absence of taxes, and the variability of dividend payments in Oman. Second, our
evidence shows that Omani financial firms are not reluctant to cut dividends. Third,
we find that financial firms do have a target dividend payout ratio that they move
quickly towards.
In general, our results stand in sharp contrast to the evidence reported using US
data where firms adopt a policy of smoothing dividends and are reluctant to cut them.
These results suggest that the institutional and economic environment play an
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important role in determining the smoothing behavior of firms. Our findings show
that there are differences in dividend policies between the Omani companies and
those in developed markets. Consequently, potential investors in the Omani market
should be aware about these differences in making their investment decisions. This
study also highlights the need for further research in order to examine whether these
results have any effect on dividend initiations and omissions in Oman.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Lintner
Model. Section 3 describes the institutional aspects of the Omani stock market.
Section 4 describes the data and presents summary statistics for the payment of
dividends, and reports some descriptive statistics for the sample. In section 5 we
examine the stability of dividends using the Lintner model. Section 6 concludes the
paper.

II. The Lintner Model
In a frequently cited study, Lintner (1956) develops a quantitative model to test for
the stability of dividend policy where he hypothesizes the following relationship
between dividends and earnings:

D * t  rEt

(1)

where D * t is the target level of dividends for any year t, r is the target payout ratio,
and Et is the firm’s net earnings in year t. In addition, Lintner (1956) also predicts
that a firm will only partially adjust to the target dividend level in any given year, so
the change in dividend payments from year t-1 to year t is given by:

Dt  Dt 1    c( D* t  Dt 1 )  ut
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(2)

where α is the intercept term, c is the speed of adjustment coefficient, u is the error
term, D * t is the target dividend payment in period t, Dt is the actual dividend payment
in period t and Dt-1 is the actual dividend payments in period t-1.
Substituting rEt for the target dividend payment ( D * t ) in equation (2), we arrive at the
following model,

Dt  Dt 1    1 Et   2 Dt 1  ut

(3)

where β1 = cr and β2 = -c.
The constant term (α) is expected to have a positive sign “to reflect the greater
reluctance to reduce than to raise dividends” Lintner (1956, p. 107). The speed of
adjustment coefficient (c) reflects that stability of dividends and measures the speed
of adjustment toward the target payout ratio (r) in response to earnings changes. The
value c reflects the dividend smoothing behaviour of firms to changes in the level of
earnings. A higher value of c indicates less dividend smoothing and vice versa. Thus,
a conservative firm will have a lower adjustment rate, while a less conservative firm
will have a higher adjustment rate.
As shown by Lintner, equation (3) can be rewritten as:

Dt    crEt  (1  c) D(t 1)  ut

(4)

This model implies that firms set their dividends in accordance with current level of
earnings, and that changes in dividends do not correspond exactly with the changes in
earnings.
To test whether dividend policy in Oman is stable, we follow Fama and Babiak
(1968) and use earnings per share (EPS) and dividends per share (DPS) rather than
total earnings as follows:

DPS t    1 DPS t 1   2 EPS t  ut
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(5)

where DPSt is the dividend per share for period t, EPSt is the earning per share for
period t, and u is the error term. Fama and Babiak argue that per share data are more
appropriate for this test than the aggregate data used by Lintner. Indeed, almost all
studies conducted since Lintner’s study employ per share data rather than aggregate
data. This model has been used by many scholars to examine the stability of dividends
such as Brittan (1964, 1966), Fama and Babiak (1968), Fama (1974), Dewnter and
Warther (1998), Adaoglu (2000), Aivazian et al. (2003a), Omet (2004), Naceur et al.
(2006), Michaely and Roberts (2007), Leary and Michaely (2009), among others.

III. Oman Stock Market: Institutional Aspects
Trading rules and practices
Oman is a small free market economy with a stable social, political, and economic
system, low taxation rates, steady economic growth, low inflation, a manageable level
of external debt, fairly liberal investment laws, a sustainable level of budget deficit,
and no controls over capital movements. In Oman, firms are subject to market
economy discipline that is comparable to Western firms.5
Trading in the MSM was computerized in 1997. MSM is a pure auction market
where trades are facilitated through brokerage firms. It is very different from the
NYSE in that there are no specialists or market makers. Trading in the market is
conducted by stockbrokers, who can not trade on their own account, which means that
they have no role in setting cum- and ex-day prices. Orders are initiated from
brokerage firms via computer terminals in their offices or on the exchange floor.
Brokerage firms match buy and sell orders. Investors intending to buy or sell stocks
execute their transactions through these brokerage firms that charge them a
5

See Al-Yahyaee (2006) for details on this issue.
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commission or transaction fees. The minimum fee that can be charged by a brokerage
firm is 0.4% and the maximum is 0.75% (0.015% of the fee is revenue for the MSM).
As Oman is a petroleum-producing country, taxes play a minor role in generating
income for the economy (Al-Yahyaee et al., 2008). As a result, shareholders are not
subject to any taxes on dividends. Likewise, there are no taxes on capital gains. The
only taxes are the 12% flat tax rate on corporate income. This makes the tax system in
Oman one of the simplest in the world.
Dividends
Firms listed at the MSM distribute dividends in two forms namely, cash dividends and
stock dividends. Paying dividends in one form or another is not compulsory. If the
board of directors proposes to distribute dividends, the details must be published in
the daily newspapers. The proposed dividend is subject to the final approval of
shareholders at the Annual General Meeting (AGM). Generally, most dividend
propositions are accepted at the AGM as the board of directors usually represents the
majority of the share capital. The date when the AGM is held is the record date.
Investors whose names are recorded as stockholders on this date are entitled to
receive the declared dividend. The following date is the ex-dividend date. Firms
usually pay dividends once a year. Some firms complement their cash dividends with
stock dividends.

IV. Data
The data for this study are obtained from “Share-Holding Guide of MSM Listed
Companies” published by the MSM. As the data were available in hard copy only, the
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first task was to input the data into a computer database. The data set comprise all
publicly traded financial firms listed at the MSM.
These data are time series cross-sectional variables which are collected over the
entire life of the MSM from 1989 to 2004. We check the accuracy of the data by
comparing the figures from the MSM Guide with the data from the firm’s financial
statements available on the internet, where possible.
The empirical literature on stability dividend policy has largely ignored firms that
do not pay dividends. If value-maximizing firms choose not to pay dividends, a
sample that contains only dividend paying firms will be subject to a selection bias.
An econometric analysis of such a sample will yield biased and inconsistent
estimates. To address this selection bias, we use both dividend-paying and nondividend paying firms. In this vein, Kim and Maddala (1992) demonstrate that it is
important to allow for zero observations on dividends in the estimation of models of
dividend behavior. Likewise, Deshmukh (2003, p. 353) states “If firms find it optimal
to not pay dividends, then their exclusion from any empirical analysis may create a
selection bias in the sample, resulting in biased and inconsistent estimates of the
underlying parameters”.6
Estimation model
We examine the stability of dividend behavior in Oman using the Lintner model.
Since there are some firms in Oman that do not pay dividends, this creates a censoring
problem which needs to be addressed in estimating the Lintner model. In this case,
previous research suggested the use of the Tobit model (Anderson, 1986; Kim and

6

For further information on this issue, see Anderson (1986) and Kim and Maddala (1992).
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Maddala, 1992; Huang, 2001a, 2001b). We use a Tobit model to test the stability of
dividends in Oman.7
Payment of dividends
Omani firms tend to attract investors by distributing large dividends (Al-Yahyaee,
2006). Most of the profitable Omani firms distribute dividends as a means of
rewarding investors for holding their securities. Stock repurchase is a rare phenomena
in Oman, however some firms supplement their cash dividends distributions with
stock dividends.
In Oman, most profitable companies a high proportion of their profits through
cash dividends. This led the CMA to issue a circular (number 12) that requires firms
to have a clear policy of dividends and to disclose it in their financial reports. With
this regard, the circular states that
“…studies have shown that the majority of Omani public joint stock companies
currently operate with a dividend cover of 100% of its available profits assigned to
dividends…We are all required to set out a clear cut dividend policy with a view to
the long term expansion of the company by striking the right mix to meet both good
housekeeping practice (retention of some earnings appropriate to the economic
conditions) and the understandable desire of shareholders for immediate returns.
CMA calls upon public joint stock companies to adopt prudent policies in cash
dividends and to disclose the same in the annual report of the board of directors
attached to the financial statements.”
Table 1. Dividend payout ratio for Omani financial firms over the period 19892004
Panel A: All firms
Year
Mean
SD
7

As a robustness check, we also use a random effects tobit regression. The tobit and random effects
tobit results are very similar to those reported using Tobit regressions.
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1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Overall period
Observations
Panel B: Dividend paying firms
Year
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Overall period
Observations

47%
94%
49%
32%
46%
45%
49%
37%
19%
20%
25%
24%
15%
33%
60%
58%
41%

30%
279%
47%
39%
35%
34%
49%
35%
30%
31%
59%
49%
30%
52%
142%
139%
67%
437

Mean
60%
149%
80%
72%
65%
62%
70%
58%
43%
55%
96%
70%
49%
55%
123%
138%
78%

SD
19%
343%
32%
18%
20%
22%
44%
26%
32%
25%
81%
62%
37%
58%
187%
189%
75%
261

Notes: The table presents the mean and the standard deviation for financial firms listed at the MSM for
each year from 1989-2004. In panel A, we present the results for all firms including both dividend
paying and non-paying firms. In panel B, we report the results for dividend paying firms.

As with other Arab countries, Omani investors seem to prefer to receive periodic
income in the form of dividends (Bolbol and Omran, 2004). For the entire sample,
Panel A of Table 1 shows that the average payout ratio is around 41%. When the zero
dividend observations are removed, the average payout ratio increases to 78% (Panel
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B). This is much higher than the payout ratio reported by Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and Aivazian et al. (2006) samples of
US firms. It is also higher than 23.3% reported by Chen and Dhiensiri (2009) for New
Zealand.

V. Empirical Results
The results presented in Table 2 show that both the coefficients on lagged DPS and
EPS are statistically significant with a positive sign. But the generally higher
coefficient and the associated t-statistic of the lagged DPS imply the greater
importance of past dividend in deciding the dividend payment. These results are
consistent with Lintner and suggest that the lagged DPS and EPS are important
factors that affect the decision to pay dividends. The coefficient on the constant is also
statistically significant with a negative sign.8 This indicates that Omani firms are not
reluctant to cut dividends, inconsistent with Lintner (1956).
The objective of using the Lintner model in this paper is to examine whether
Omani firms follow stable dividend policies. Consequently, we are interested in the
speed of adjustment. The speed of adjustment reflects how quickly the firms adjust
dividends towards the target ratio; the higher the speed of adjustment, the less the
smoothness, and the less stability in dividends. In our case, the speed of adjustment is
0.9412 which indicates that Omani firms have not smooth their dividends. Rather,
they change their dividends frequently. These results are in line with that reported by
Esteban and Pérez (2001) where they find that the speed of adjustment for European
financial firms over the period 1992 to 1998 is 0.76. They are also consistent with
those reported by Naceur et al. (2006) for Tunisian firms which ranged between 0.68
8

The negative constant reported in this paper is consistent with the results documented by Kim and
Maddala (1992) and Huang (2001a, 2001b) who utilize Tobit regression to estimate the Lintner model.
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and 1.56. However, our speed of adjustment is higher than the 0.49 reported by Bodla
et al. (2009) for Indian financial firms.
Table 2. Lintner model estimates
Variable
Coefficient
C
-0.1457***
DPS-1
0.0588***
EPS
0.5335***
Observations
Log Likelihood
Wald Test [χ2 (2)]a
P-value

T-Statistic
-7.3644
2.7855
46.8658
377
-142.8506
509.3700
0.0000

Notes: We estimate Tobit regression for financial firms listed at the MSM over the period 1989-2004.
The dependent variable is the dividend per share. The explanatory variables are the lagged DPS and the
current EPS. The table shows the variable, their coefficients, and their corresponding t-statistics. (*),
(**), and (***) represents significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels, respectively. The number in
parenthesis in the Wald test represents the degrees of freedom.

Another variable of interest is whether Omani financial firms have a target payout
ratio or not. Lintner (1956) hypothesizes that firms set a long-term target payout ratio
and move gradually towards the target. We calculate the target payout ratio and find
that Omani financial firms have a target payout ratio of 0.5668.9 This finding
indicates that financial firms do have a target dividend payout ratio that they move
quickly towards. Our target payout ratio is higher than the 0.27 reported by Naceur et
al. (2006) for Tunisian financial firms and the 0.135 reported by Bodla et al. (2007)
for Indian firms, but smaller than the 0.85 reported by Esteban and Pérez (2001) for
European firms.

VI. Conclusion
The extensive literature on dividend policy of US firms shows that firms adopt a
policy of smoothing dividends. Further, managers tend to set along-term target payout
ratios and are reluctant to cut dividends. We investigate whether these stylized facts
9

We calculate the target payout ratio as (the coefficient on EPS divided by the speed of adjustment).
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also hold for Omani financial firms which operate in a substantially different
institutional and corporate governance regime which is characterized by the absence
of taxes on dividends, high dividend payments, concentrated ownership, relatively
weak corporate governance, and high bank debt financing. We use a panel data on a
sample of Omani firms and take account of the zero observations using Tobit models.
Regarding the speed of adjustment of dividends towards the long-term target
payout ratio, our results show that Omani financial firms adjust their dividend policies
very quickly and they are willing to cut their dividends. These results suggest that
Omani financial firms have unstable dividend policies. The results lend support to the
propositions put forward by the high bank leverage, absence of taxes, and the
variability of dividend payments in Oman. Our results also show that Omani firms
have target payout ratios and they move quickly towards.
Our findings show that there are differences in dividend policies between the
Omani companies and those in developed markets. Consequently, potential investors
in the Omani market should be aware about these differences in making their
investment decisions. This study also highlights the need for further research in order
to examine whether these results have any effect on dividend initiations and omissions
in Oman.
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